



CHAPTER TWELVE

Early emotional development

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Introduction

If we observe newborn infants, we see a narrow range of emotional behavior. They cry and show distress when pained or lonely or in need of food and attention. They look attentive and focused on objects and people in their world. They listen to sounds, look at objects, and respond to being tickled. Moreover, they seem to show positive emotions, such as happiness and contentment. When fed, picked up, or changed, they show relaxed body posture, they smile, and they appear content. Although they show a wide range of postural and even facial expressions, the set of discrete emotions that they exhibit is limited. Yet, in a matter of months and, indeed, by the end of the third year of life, these same children display the full range of human emotions. For example, they show shame when they fail a task and pride when they succeed. Indeed, some have suggested that by this age, almost the full range of adult emotions can be said to exist (Lewis, 1992b). In 3 years, the display and range of human emotions goes from a few to the highly differentiated many.

In order to understand emotional development, we need to look at infant and toddler behavior in both the emotional and cognitive domains, for emotions and their developments are completely tied to cognitive developments. In fact, we often use emotions to infer cognitions and cognitions to infer emotions. For example, when young infants see a small adult (a dwarf) walking toward them, they show a face that can be scored as a surprise face. What are they surprised at? They are not surprised when they see a young child or an adult of normal height walking toward them, but they are when it is someone with the height of a young child but the face of an adult (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1982). Surprise reveals to us who observe infants that the infant knows (has cognitions about) the relationship between facial

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One particular cognition that is most important to the development of human emotions is that of self-knowledge or a **meta-representation** or idea that 'this is me' (Lewis, 1999). This idea of me is the same as **consciousness**. We measure it by observing whether infants/toddlers recognize themselves in mirrors. The emergence of self-knowledge or consciousness alters old emotions and gives rise to new ones. To understand emotional development, then, means that we have to understand cognitive changes and, in particular, the development of self.

In the discussion of emotional development, we can think of two broad types of emotions, those that we call **basic or primary emotions** and those that we call **self-conscious emotions**. The former are emotions that most likely are present in humans and other animals. The latter, self-conscious emotions, require elaborate cognitions including the central one having to do with consciousness; that is, the idea of 'me.' Charles Darwin in his famous work (1872/1965) was the first to make the distinction between these two types. He believed that a self was necessary in order for these later emotions to emerge. Moreover, he thought that they emerge around 3 years in the human child. He described blushing—a reddening of the facial skin—and suggested that blushing was a measure of these self-conscious emotions which for him involved elaborate cognitions involving 'the self thinking about others, thinking of us ... which excites a blush' (p. 325).

A model of emotional development

Most of emotional life emerges over the first 3 years. Although not all emotions appear, the great majority are present in the 3-year-old. This is not to say that other emotions do not emerge after 3 years of age, or that the emotions that have emerged are not elaborated more fully. They do; however, the major framework exists by the age of 3. In our discussion of development, we will divide the chapter into three sections: (1) early or primary emotions; (2) the development of self-consciousness; and (3) self-conscious emotions. Figure 12.1 presents our model of emotional development. For example, we can see that in the first 6 months, the **primary emotions** appear and are the first to emerge. About the middle of the second year of life, consciousness emerges, which gives rise to the first set of self-conscious emotions. In the middle of the third year, or at about 2½ years of age, the child acquires and is able to use societal standards and rules in order to evaluate their behavior. This second cognitive milestone, along with consciousness, gives rise to the second set of self-conscious emotions, those that are called **self-conscious evaluative emotions**.




Figure 12.1 Behavioral experiments have led to a model of the emergence of self-conscious emotions. Some noncognitive, primary emotions are evident at birth; others emerge by the age of 6 months. Sometime in the middle of the second year, the child develops a sense of self, as evidenced by the emergence of self-referential behaviors. At this time emotions such as envy and empathy emerge. The child will also express self-conscious embarrassment when looked at, pointed at, or singled out in some way. Between the ages of 2½ and 3 years, the child starts to incorporate a set of standards, rules, and goals. The child also develops a sense of success and failure and the ability to determine whether they have lived up to expectations. At that point, between the ages of 2½ and 3 years, the child shows signs of complex self-conscious emotions. The child can express shame in its extreme forms and in its milder manifestation of embarrassment, as well as pride and guilt.

Early or primary emotions

These early emotions are present within the first 6 months or so of life. Following Bridges (1932), we assume that at birth the child shows a bipolar emotional life. On one hand, there is general distress marked by crying and irritability. On the other hand, there is pleasure marked by satiation, attention, and responsiveness to the environment. Attention to the environment and interest in it appears from the beginning of life and we can place this either in the positive pole or, if we choose, we can separate this; thus, we suggest a tripartite division with pleasure at one end, distress at the other, and interest as a separate dimension (see Figure 12.1).

By 3 months, joy emerges (Figure 12.2). Infants start to smile and appear to show excitement/happiness when confronted with familiar events, such as

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


Figure 12.2 Joy face.

faces of people they know or even unfamiliar faces. Very early smiling to people and sounds appear to be reflective in nature. For example, sighted and blind infants do not differ in their smiling behavior in the first 3 months of life (Fraiberg, 1974). Later, however, smiling becomes more associated with pleasant events that the infant sees, such as the face of its mother, father, or older sibling. Smiling also now takes place when the infant is played with. Therefore, smiling after 2 months is not reflective and is related to the emotion of joy or happiness.

Also by 3 months, sadness emerges, especially around the withdrawal or loss of desired objects or actions (Figure 12.3). Three-month-old children show sadness when their mothers stop interacting with them. For example, when mothers sit opposite their 3-month-olds and play with them, smiling faces, even laughter, can be observed. However, this laughter and smiling turns to sadness and even anger when the infant's mother turns away from them. At this point, the child often becomes sad and in some cases even starts to cry. This sad expression disappears once the mother starts again to interact with the child.

Disgust also appears in its early form (Figure 12.4). Disgust is seen when infants spit out and try to get rid of unpleasant-tasting or -smelling objects placed in their mouths. This disgust face appears to be a defensive reflect designed to help get rid of food which does not smell or taste good to the infant. Given that there is little hand-mouth or grasping coordination, the infant's ability to spit out something unpleasant is an important adaptive response. As we will see, this early form of disgust becomes utilized later

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Figure 12.3 Sad face.

when it then reflects learned taste and smell aversion, such as specific food preferences. Thus, by 3 months, children are already showing interest, joy, sadness, anger, and disgust, and exhibit these expressions in appropriate contexts.

Anger has been reported to emerge between 4 and 6 months (Stenberg, Campos & Emde, 1983). Anger is seen on the face when children are frustrated, in particular when their hands and arms are pinned down and they are prevented from moving (Figure 12.5). However, Lewis, Alessandri, and Sullivan (1990) have shown anger in 2-month-old infants when a learned instrumental act was blocked. For example, a 2-month-old child can be taught that when they pull their arm, to which a string has been attached, a slide appears on the screen. Thus, every time the child pulls, a picture goes on. After only 3–5 minutes, most 2-month-olds learn the association between moving their arm and a picture appearing. Once they learn this, they show anger if we arrange it so that the picture does not come on. This study demonstrates the earliest known emergence of anger. Anger is a particularly interesting emotion since, from Darwin (1872/1965) on, it has been associated with unique cognitive capacities. Anger is thought to be both a set of facial and motor/body responses designed to overcome an obstacle. Notice that in this definition of anger, the organism has to have some knowledge about the relation between the arm pull and picture going on. For anger to be said to be adaptive it has to be a response whose function is to overcome a barrier blocking a goal. In some sense then, means–ends knowledge has to be available and the demonstration of anger at this early point in life reflects the child's early knowledge acquisition relative to this ability (Lewis, 1991).




Figure 12.4 Disgust face.




Figure 12.5 Anger face.

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


Figure 12.6 Fear face.

Fearfulness seems to emerge still later (Figure 12.6). Our best guess is that it is around 6–8 months, although it appears to reach its peak at 18 months, when measured as fearfulness at the approach of a stranger. Again, fearfulness reflects further cognitive development. For example, Schaffer (1974) has shown that in order for children to show fearfulness they have to be capable of comparing the event that causes them fearfulness with some other event. For example, in **stranger fear** the infant has to compare the face of the stranger coming toward it to that of its internal representation or memory of faces. Fear occurs when the approaching face is found to be discrepant or unfamiliar relative to all other faces that the child remembers. Children's ability to show fearfulness in these situations cannot emerge until a comparison ability appears. Children around 6–8 months of age begin to show this behavior, although it has been reported by some to occur even earlier, especially in children who seem to be precocious.

Surprise also appears in the first 6 months of life (Figure 12.7). Children show surprise when there are violations of expected events; for example,

when infants show interest (Schaffer, 1978). Surprise also appears as a response to unfamiliar faces. Children who were shown surprise when they were caused the picture here reflects interest.

In the first 6 months of life, the emergence of the basic emotions that underlie the discrimination of faces is of some sort. Although many species have the elaborate capacity, for example, anger to obtain a goal does not produce a path to food is

Self-conscious

As we have tried to show, self-consciousness requires some development by 6 months, but it



Figure 12.7 Surprise face.

when infants see a small adult walking toward them, they are reported to show interest and surprise rather than fear or joy (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1978). Surprise can be seen when there is violation of what is expected or as a response to discovery as in an 'aha' experience. In the studies where children were taught to pull a string in order to turn on a picture, they showed surprise at the point when they discovered that the arm pull is what caused the picture to appear (Lewis, Sullivan & Michalson, 1984). Surprise here reflects insight.

In the first 6–8 months of life, children's emotional behavior reflects the emergence of the six early emotions, called by some primary emotions or basic emotions (see e.g., Izard, 1978; Tomkins, 1962). The cognitive processes that underlie these early emotions consist of perceptual abilities, including discrimination and short-term memory, and are representative abilities of some sort. Although these cognitive processes are necessary, it is likely that many species in the animal kingdom possess them. They do not require the elaborate cognitions that are involved in the next set of emotions. For example, anger is elicited in animals as well as infants when a learned response to obtain a goal is blocked. Infants show angry faces when the string pull does not produce the picture, and rats show angry behavior when the learned path to food is blocked.

Self-consciousness

As we have tried to indicate, the development of the early or primary emotions requires some cognition. One cognition that they do not have in the first 6 months, but do acquire in the middle of the second year, is the cognition

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related to self or what we have called **consciousness**. Infants younger than 8–9 months of age show all the basic emotions. The question is, do they experience them? If we think of facial expressions representing an internal emotional state, then we can say that infants have a happy state. However, before consciousness emerges, they may have the state, but do not experience the state. For example, emotional experience requires that the child knows it is having the emotional state. Consider that when we say ‘I am frightened,’ or ‘I am happy,’ the subject and object is the same, one’s self. Thus, the statement, ‘I am happy,’ implies two things. First, it implies that I have an internal state called happiness, and second, that I perceive that internal state in myself. Until the child is capable of consciousness, the ability to experience the primary emotions does not exist. Consider this example:

Susan, a 7-month-old, sits in a chair watching a stranger move toward her. When the stranger reaches over to touch her hand, Susan pulls it away and begins to cry.

Susan’s behavior, her crying, pushing away, and fearful face, suggests she is in a state of fear. However, if we ask whether she is **conscious** of being fearful, we would have to conclude that she is not. From a variety of studies we know that consciousness does not emerge until the second half of the second year. As such, we may say that, although Susan is in a state of fear, she is not aware of herself as being fearful. Thus, from a developmental perspective, it is reasonable to believe that Susan has a disassociation between the emotional state and her experience of that state. That state and experience of emotions can be disconnected is easily seen in adults who possess both state and consciousness.

Michelle is driving a car on a highway. As she is traveling at 65 mph, her left front tire blows. For the next 20 seconds, Michelle’s attention is focused on getting the car to a safe spot off the road. Only when she has finally stopped the car does she experience her fearfulness.

We would hold that although Michelle was in a state of fear before stopping her car, she could not **experience** her fear (was not conscious of it) until she could focus her attention on herself. Thus, as in the case of the 7-month-old child, there is a dissociation between state and experience (Lewis & Michalson, 1983).

The idea of consciousness, our ability to experience ourselves, is best captured by looking at R. D. Laing’s book *Knots* (1970). Laing argued for the importance and uniqueness of the human capacity for **self-reflexive behavior**. Such behavior can be observed in verb usage, for example, the difference when one makes reference to washing oneself as opposed to washing anything other than self. In French the verb structure would be *se laver* for washing oneself as opposed to *faire la vaisselle* for washing the dishes. Such reflexive behavior is seen as well in the social knots as described by Laing. Consider the example: ‘I know my wife knows that I

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know that she knows that I bought a new tie.' Such an example of reflexive behavior implies that not only do I have knowledge of myself, but also I have knowledge of someone else's self having knowledge of myself. Such complex recursive behavior is what must be considered when we discuss consciousness or experience, especially from a developmental perspective. Consciousness, that is, thinking about the self, does not emerge until the second half of the second year of life. Moreover, we have been able to demonstrate that the emergence is dependent on a certain level of general mental maturity.

We study this by looking at infants' responses to mirrors. We place children in front of the mirror and look at what they do. For the most part, they look briefly and then turn away. After this initial exposure, we place a red dot on the child's nose and place the child back in front of the mirror (the 'rouge on the nose' test, mentioned in Chapter 1 and 2). At this point, the child has two possible responses; they can touch the mirror and the image or they can use the mirror to direct their fingers to touch their own noses. No child before the age of 15 months old touches their nose, while at 15 months approximately 20% do so. If the children are developing normally, 100% will touch their own noses by 24 months (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). At the same time and in conjunction with this self-recognition, two additional features of their knowledge about themselves emerge. First, the development of personal pronouns such as 'me' and 'mine' and second, pretend play where the child pretends that the crayon is an airplane, even though they know it is not (Lewis & Ramsay, 2004)!

When consciousness emerges, and there is reason to believe that this is a maturational process common to all humans, the next set of emotions—the self-conscious emotions—start to appear.

Self-conscious emotions

Figure 12.1 shows the next step in emotional development. Once consciousness emerges, so do at least three new emotions: **empathy**, **jealousy**, and **exposure embarrassment**. These emotions require, at least, a sense of self. For example, empathy, by definition, involves the ability to put yourself in the role of another. So, for example, if I know that I am likely to feel unease in a strange social situation, I am able to utilize my own feeling to assume that you (another person) are also likely to feel unease. In one of the only studies to look at the association between self-recognition and empathy, Bischof-Kohler (1991) found that only after infants gain the ability to recognize themselves in mirrors were they able to show empathy, both on their faces (as in a sad expression), as well as in their actions (such as tapping the back of someone they imagine is sad). Likewise for jealousy. We need to have consciousness for jealousy, since jealousy is the emotion associated with wanting for the

self what someone else has. Without a self or consciousness, it would not be possible to have jealousy.

Finally, the emotion of embarrassment is dependent on consciousness. We will discuss two kinds of embarrassment; the first one we call **exposure embarrassment** and the second one **evaluative embarrassment**. We will leave the evaluative embarrassment until later since it requires cognitions that only appear after 2 years of age.

In certain situations of exposure, people become embarrassed. It is not related to negative evaluation, as is shame. Perhaps the best example is the case of being complimented. The phenomenological experience of those who appear before audiences is that of embarrassment caused by the positive comments of the introduction. Consider the moment when the speaker is introduced: The person introducing the speaker extols his or her virtues. Surprisingly, praise, rather than displeasure or negative evaluation, elicits this type of embarrassment!

Another example of this type of embarrassment can be seen in our reactions to public display. When people observe someone looking at them, they are apt to become self-conscious, look away, or touch or adjust their bodies. When the observed person is a woman, she will often adjust or touch her hair; men are less likely to touch their hair, but may adjust their clothes or change their body posture. In few cases do the observed people look sad. If anything, they appear pleased by the attention. This combination—gaze turned away briefly, no frown, and nervous touching—looks like this first type of embarrassment.

A third example of embarrassment as exposure can be seen in the following experiment:

When I wish to demonstrate that embarrassment can be elicited just by exposure, I announce that I am going to point randomly at a student. I repeatedly mention that my pointing is random and that it does not reflect a judgment about the person. I close my eyes and point. My pointing invariably elicits embarrassment in the student pointed to. (Lewis, 2003)

In each of these examples, there is no negative evaluation of the self in regard to standards or rules. In these situations, it is difficult to imagine embarrassment as a less intense form of shame. Since praise cannot readily lead to an evaluation of failure, it is likely that embarrassment resulting from compliments, from being looked at, and from being pointed to has more to do with the exposure of the self than with evaluation. Situations other than praise come to mind in which a negative evaluation can be inferred, although it may not be the case. Take, for example, walking into a room before the speaker has started to talk. It is possible to arrive on time, only to find people already seated. When you are walking into the room, eyes turn toward you, and you may experience embarrassment. One could say that there is a negative self-evaluation: 'I should have been earlier; I should

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Figure 12.8 Embarrassment figure.

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These three emotions, at least, require the emergence of consciousness but do not require that the child be able to evaluate their behavior against some standard or rule which they have learned from the people around them. This occurs only later.

Self-conscious evaluative emotions

The self-conscious evaluative emotions depend on the development of a number of cognitive skills. First, children have to have absorbed a set of standards, rules, and goals. Second, they have to have a sense of self. And finally, they have to be able to evaluate the self with regard to those standards, rules, and goals and then make a determination of success and failure.

As a first step in self-evaluation, a child has to decide whether a particular event is the result of his own action. If, for example, an object breaks while the child is using it, he might blame himself for breaking it, or he might decide the object was faulty to begin with. If he places the blame on himself, he is making an **internal attribution**. If he does not blame himself, he is making an **external evaluation** and is not likely to go on to the next step of evaluation.

Whether a child is inclined to make an internal or an external attribution depends on the situation and on the child’s own characteristics. Some people are likely to blame themselves no matter what happens. Dweck and Leggett (1988) studied children’s attitudes toward their academic performance. They

found that some children attributed their success or failure to external forces. Others were likely to evaluate success and failure in terms of their own actions. Interestingly, strong sex differences emerged: Boys are more apt to hold themselves responsible for their success and others for their failure, whereas girls are apt to do the opposite.

Psychologists still do not entirely understand how people decide what constitutes success or failure after they have assumed responsibility for an event. This aspect of self-evaluation is particularly important, because the same standards, rules, and goals can result in radically different emotions, depending on whether success or failure is attributed to oneself. Sometimes children assess their actions in ways that do not conform to the evaluation that others might give them. Many factors are involved in producing inaccurate or unique evaluations. These include early failures in the self system, leading to narcissistic disorders, harsh socialization experience, and high levels of reward for success or punishment for failure (Hoffman, 1988; Kohut, 1977; Morrison, 1986). The evaluation of one's own behavior in terms of success and failure plays a very important role in shaping an individual's goals and new plans.

In a final evaluation step, a child determines whether success or failure is global or specific. Global attributions come about when a child is inclined to focus on the total self (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978). Some children, some of the time, attribute the success or failure of a particular action to the total self: They use such self-evaluative phrases as 'I am bad (or good).' On such occasions, the focus is not on the behavior but on the whole self. The self becomes embroiled in the self, because the self-evaluation is total. There is no way out. Using such global attribution results in thinking of nothing else but the self. During these times, especially when the global evaluation is negative, a child becomes confused and speechless. The child is unable to act and is driven away from action, wanting to hide or disappear (H. B. Lewis, 1971).

In some situations children make specific attributions, focusing on specific actions. Thus, it is not the total self that has done something wrong or good; instead, a particular behavior is judged. Consider the child who has not solved a puzzle in the set time period they were asked to do. At such times, children will use an evaluative phrase as, 'I forgot to look at all the pieces. Next time I'll look at them all.' Notice that the child's focus here is not on the totality of the self but on the specific behavior of the self in a specific situation. When they focus on specific features of their behavior, their attribution is specific not global.

The tendency to make **global or specific attributions** may be a personality style (Beck, 1979). Global attributions for negative events are generally uncorrelated with global attributions for positive events (Abramson *et al.*, 1978). It is only when positive or negative events are taken into account that relatively stable and consistent attributional patterns are observed (Kaslow,

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Ream, Pollack & Siegel, 1988). Some children are likely to be stable in their global and specific evaluations under most conditions of success or failure. Such factors are thought to have important consequences for a variety of fixed personality patterns. For example, Beck (1979) and others have found that depressed people are likely to make stable, negative, global attributions, whereas nondepressed individuals are less likely to be stable in their global attributions.

Shame and guilt

Of all the self-conscious emotions, **shame**, until recently, has been the most undervalued in its power to motivate human behavior. Earlier theorists tended to attribute certain actions to guilt, but many psychologists now believe that shame is the more appropriate underlying emotion (Janoff-Bulman, 1979; Buss, 1980; H. B. Lewis, 1987; Lewis, 1992a,b).

Shame results when a child judges her actions as a failure in regard to her standards, rules, and goals and then makes a global attribution. The child experiencing shame wishes to hide, disappear, or die (H. B. Lewis, 1971; Lewis, 1992a,b). It is a highly negative and painful state that also disrupts ongoing behavior and causes confusion in thought and an inability to speak. The body of the shamed child seems to shrink, as if to disappear from the eye of the self or others (see Figure 12.9). Because of the intensity of this emotional state, and the global attack on the self-system, all that children can do when presented with such a state is to attempt to rid themselves of it.

Some children try to dissociate the shameful feelings from themselves. The most severe manifestation of this is in people with multiple personality disorder, where a child tries to create other selves to bear the shame (Ross,



Figure 12.9 Shame face.

1989). Often it is a child who has seriously traumatic incidents such as childhood sexual abuse who takes refuge in this way. It is not the sexual abuse that creates the disorder; it is the shame brought about by the abuse (Feiring, Taska & Lewis, 2002; Lewis, 1992a,b).

Shame is not produced by any specific situation, but rather by an individual's interpretation of an event. Even more important is the observation that shame is not necessarily related to whether the event is public or private. Failure attributed to the whole self can be public or private, and can center around moral as well as social action.

If shame arises from a global attribution of failure, guilt arises from a specific attribution (Ferguson, Stegge & Damhuis, 1991; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Guilt and regret are produced when a child evaluates her behavior as a failure, but focuses on the specific features of the self that led to the failure. A guilty child is likely to consider actions and behaviors that are likely to repair the failure. Guilty individuals are pained by their evaluation of failure, but the pain is directed to the cause of the failure or the object of harm. Because the cognitive attributional process focuses on the action of the self rather than on the totality of self, the feeling produced is not as intensely negative as shame and does not lead to confusion and the loss of action. In fact, guilt almost always has associated with it a corrective action that the child can take (but does not necessarily do so) to repair the failure and prevent it from happening again (Barrett, 1995). In guilt, the self is differentiated from the object. The emotion is thus less intense and more capable of dissipation.

Guilt and shame have different physical manifestations as well. Whereas a shamed child hunches over in an attempt to hide or disappear, a guilty person moves in space as if trying to repair the action. The marked postural differences between guilt and shame are helpful both in distinguishing these emotions and in measuring individual differences.

Hubris

Self-consciousness is not entirely a negative thing. Self-evaluation can also lead to positive and even overly positive emotions. **Hubris**, defined as exaggerated pride or self-confidence, is an example of the latter. Hubris is the emotion elicited when success with regard to one's standards, rules, and goals is applied to a child's entire self. It is the global condition. Children inclined to be hubristic evaluate their actions positively and then say to themselves: 'I have succeeded. I am a success.' Often, hubris is considered an unlikeable trait that should be avoided.

Hubris is difficult to sustain because of its globality. The feeling is generated by a nonspecific action. Because such a feeling is alluring, yet transient, children prone to hubris ultimately derive little satisfaction from the emotion. Consequently, they seek out and invent situations likely to repeat this emotional state. According to Morrison (1989), this can be done either by

altering their status or success.

A child who is proud of their success may be scorned or disdain by others. In extreme cases, this can lead to social rejection. The hubristic child, therefore, often finds themselves in difficult situations. Children who are proud of their achievements may make them inseparable from their success. With hubris, other children may be envious of their actions or the hubristic child may be envious of others by claiming

Pride

If hubris is the global condition, then pride is the specific emotion. It is the emotion of a successful outcome. Here the focus is on the specific action. In pride, the self is differentiated from the object. In hubris, the self and the object are not differentiated. As noted by Stipek, Reardon, and Reardon (1995), the comparison between pride and hubris at a particular goal is associated with pride is associated

altering their standards, rules, and goals or by reevaluating what constitutes success.

A child who considers himself globally successful may be viewed with disdain by others. Often the hubristic person is described as 'puffed up' or, in extreme cases, grandiose or narcissistic (Kohut, 1977; Morrison, 1986). The hubristic child may be perceived as insolent or contemptuous. Hubristic children have difficulty in interpersonal relations, since their hubris likely makes them insensitive to the wishes, needs, and desires of others, leading to interpersonal conflict. Moreover, given the contemptuousness associated with hubris, other children are likely to be shamed by the nature of the actions of the hubristic person. Narcissists often derive pleasure in shaming others by claiming their superiority.

Pride

If hubris is the global emotion that follows a positive assessment of an action, then pride is the specific emotion. A child experiencing pride feels joyful at the successful outcome of a particular action, thought, or feeling (Figure 12.10). Here the focus of pleasure is specific and related to a particular behavior. In pride, the self and object are separated, as in guilt, and unlike shame and hubris, where subject and object are fused. Heckhausen (1984, 1987) and Stipek, Recchia, and McClintic (1992) have made a particularly apt comparison between pride and achievement motivation, where succeeding at a particular goal motivates activity. Because the positive state engendered by pride is associated with a particular action, individuals have available



Figure 12.10 Pride figure.

to them the means for reproducing the emotion. Notice that pride's specific focus allows for action.

Embarrassment

Embarrassment as a consequence of evaluation of one's actions, called **evaluative embarrassment**, is closely related to shame. Embarrassment is distinguished in contrast to shame by the intensity of the latter. Whereas shame appears to be strong and disruptive, embarrassment is clearly less intense and does not involve disruption of thought and language. Furthermore, children who are embarrassed do not assume the posture of someone wishing to hide, disappear, or die. In fact, their bodies reflect an ambivalent approach and avoidance posture. An embarrassed person alternately looks at people and then looks away, smiling all the while (Edelman & Hampson, 1981). In contrast, the shamed child rarely smiles while averting her gaze. Thus, from a behavioral point of view, shame and embarrassment appear to be different.

The difference in intensity can probably be attributed to the nature of the failed standard, rule, or goal. Some standards are more or less associated with the core of self; for me, failure at driving a car is less important than is failure at helping a child. Failures associated with less important and less central standards, rules, and goals result in embarrassment rather than shame.

There are other types of evaluative self-conscious emotions, but these, pride, hubris, shame, guilt, and evaluative embarrassment, have been the ones most studied. The emergence of this class of emotions completes the major development of emotional life, creating in children both a wide array of different emotions, some more complex than others. It also includes the developmental shift from emotional states to emotional experiences, thus giving the human child the extra capacities both to have particular emotions and to be aware that they have them.

SUMMARY

By 3 years of age, the emotional life of a child has become highly differentiated. From the original tripartite set of emotions, the child comes within 3 years to possess an elaborate and complex emotional system. Although the emotional life of the 3-year-old will continue to be elaborated and will expand, the basic structures necessary for this expansion have already been formed. New experiences, additional meaning, and more elaborate cognitive capacities will all serve to enhance and elaborate the child's emotional life. However, by 3 years of age, the child already shows those emotions that Darwin (1872/1965) characterized as unique to our species—the emotions of self-consciousness. With these, the major developmental activity has been achieved.

CHAPTER THIRTEEN Social Cognition

MICHAEL LEWIS

Introduction

In order to understand the nature of the social interactions which allow for the child's relationship that is found in infancy, the infant will cry and be supported, cognitive capacity is produced, little cognition is a process to be a wire fly away together synchrony when the is established Emotional Developmental empathic response of another child on the toddler cognitive ability of 'me,' leads to emerge.

Understanding as embedded to include no other important of its life. The